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mechanism such as the distribution of power of the diﬀerent players is equal (or closer) to
a pre established target. This tradition is especially popular when considering two tiers
voting mechanisms: each player votes in his own jurisdiction to designate a delegate for the
upper tier; and the question is to assign a certain number of mandates for each delegate
according the population of the jurisdiction he or she represents. Unfortunately, there exist
several measures of power, which in turn imply diﬀerent distributions of the mandates for
the same pre established target. The purposes of this paper are twofold: ﬁrst, we calculate
the probability that the two most important power indices, the Banzhaf index and the
Shapley-Shubik index, lead to the same voting rule when the target is the same. Secondly,
we determine which index on average comes closer to the pre established target.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The concept of power index is probably the most famous application of game theory to
political sciences. The objective of a power index is to evaluate the a priori inﬂuence of a
given player for a given voting rule by computing the number of times he or she is decisive.
In a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ binary decision, a player is said to be decisive each time he or she can
reverse the decision by changing his vote. Most of the literature on power indices is then
devoted to the evaluation of the inﬂuence of the diﬀerent players in diﬀerent institutions,
e.g. shareholders in a ﬁrm, political parties in a parliament, countries in the United Nations,
US states in the Electoral College, etc.
The power indices can also be used from a normative perspective rather than from a
descriptive one. If the objective is to allocate the power to the players according to a pre
established target, what are the political institutions that come closer to this objective? This
institution design problem is known as the ‘inverse problem’ in the power index literature.
It is an issue as old as the ﬁeld: Penrore [10] already remarked in 1952 that, according to
his measure of power1, the best way to equalize the inﬂuence of the citizens of diﬀerent
s t a t e si nat w ot i e r sv o t i n gs y s t e ms h o u l db et oa l l o c a t et oe a c hs t a t ean u m b e ro fm a n d a t e s
proportionally to the square root of its population.
In this paper, we study the inverse problem from a more general perspective. Consider
the whole class of weighted quota games, where each player is endowed with a certain
number of mandates, or weights, and where a decision is approved if and only if the number
of players that vote ‘yes’ altogether strictly gathers more than q votes. Then knowing that
the power must be as close as possible to some pre established normative target (typically,
the distribution of population of the diﬀerent members of a political union) which is the best
voting rule? The problem is tricky and time consuming (see Leech [8]) and an algorithm to
solve the inverse problem is proposed in a companion paper (see Barth´ el´ emy and Martin [2]).
But apart from computational issues, another question with the inverse problem approach
is the choice of power index. The literature on power indices has suggested several ways to
measure power, the most famous indices being the ones proposed by Shapley and Shubik
[11] and Banzhaf [1]. Thus, depending on the choice of the power index, the results of
1Penrose’s index is also now known as the absolute Banzhaf index. For more on the history of the power
indices and the fact that they have been rediscovered several times in diﬀerent ﬁelds, see the paper by
Felsenthal and Machover [5].
2the inverse program may lead to diﬀerent optimal weighted quota games. The primary
objective of this paper is to examine to which extend the choice of diﬀerent power indices
may change the solution of the optimization problem. As a by product, we will also observe
which index, on average, performs better in terms of minimizing the total distance to a
given target.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the deﬁnitions
and the basic concepts. Section 3 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the three player case.
The results for the general case are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2D e ﬁnitions
2.1 Weighted quota games
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of players (elsewhere voters, states, cities, etc), of cardinality
n.L e tG =[ q;w1,...,w n] be a weighted quota game where q is the quota and wi is the weight
attached to the player i,w i t h
n
i=1 wi =¯ w and q<¯ w.W ea s s u m et h a tw1  w2  ...  wn.
We say that a coalition S ⊆ N (that is a group of players) is winning if and only if

i∈S wi >q .
For example, consider the following weighted quota game G =[ 9 ;8 ,4,4,1]. The coalition
S = {1,2} is winning (we write S ∈ W with W the set of all winning coalitions) since
w1 + w2 >q .I fS ∈ W,w ea t t r i b u t eav a l u e1t oS, denoted v(S)=1a n di fS  ∈ W,w e
have v(S) = 0. We only consider proper voting games, that is voting games such that if
S ∈ W then N\S  ∈ W. In particular, this implies q ≥ 1
2 ¯ w. A weighted quota game is a
majority weighted game if q =¯ w/2.
2.2 Power indices
Several power indices are proposed in the literature and all of them admit the importance
of a particular player, the decisive player. A player is decisive in a coalition S ∈ W if this
coalition becomes a loosing coalition when the player leaves it. In the previous example,
player 1 is decisive since w2 <q ,t h a ti sS\{1}  ∈ W. In this paper we only consider
the two most important power indices, the Shapley-Shubik power index and the Banzhaf
power index (for a complete description of the power indices, see Straﬃn [12], Felsenthal
and Machover [5] or Laruelle [7]).
3The Shapley-Shubik index [11] takes into account the following reasoning: consider a
player to construct a coalition and analyze if this coalition is winning. If it is not the case,
add a second player and check again whether this coalition is winning and so on. When
a player, in joining a coalition, makes the coalition winning, we call him a pivotal player.
Now, consider all the possible permutations of the player (n!). The Shapley-Shubik index is
the number of times where a player is pivotal divided by the total number of permutations
of the voters. The Shapley-Shubik index of the player i for a game G reads:
φi(G)=
number of orders with i pivotal
n!
(1)




(s − 1)!(n − s)!
n!
[v(S) − v(S\{i})] (2)
with s the number of players in S.S i n c ev(S)=0o rv(S)=1 ,[ v(S)−v(S\{i})] is non-null
if and only if the player i is pivotal in S. φ(G)=( φ1(G),φ2(G),...,φn(G)) is the power
vector associated with the Shapley-Shubik index for the game G.
The calculus of the Banzhaf index [1] is simpler. We just have to identify the number
of winning coalitions where the player i is decisive among the 2n − 1 coalitions he belongs
to, irrespective of the order of arrivals in the coalition, and divide it by the total number of
decisive players. The Banzhaf index of the player i for game G is then
βi(G)=
number of times for which player i is decisive











β(G)=( β1(G),β2(G),...,βn(G)) is the power vector associated with the Banzhaf index
for the game G.
2.3 Meeting the target
In some voting problems, there might exist a pre existing norm concerning a distribution
of the power that we may wish to attain. For example, if the players are the countries of
a federal union, one may wish the power of a player to be proportional to its population.
In a charity trust, the diﬀerent participants may wish their inﬂuence to be proportional
4to the amount of their donation. In a ﬁrm, some minority shareholders may wish their
interests to be protected from the decisions of a major shareholder. Thus, we assume that
there exists a pre established target vector on the ideal repartition of power. We denote by
p =( p1,...,p n) ∈ Pn the target, with Pn = {p ∈ Rn : pi ≥ 0 and
n
i=1 pi =1 }. Knowing
this distribution p, we then wish the distribution of power to be as close as possible to p.
The problem is then to determine, given the ”population” vector p representing the ideal
inﬂuence of the players, the distribution of the weights (w1,...w n) and the quota q such
that the sum of the diﬀerences between the target and the power is minimal. This approach
comes from the studies of Leech [8], Pajala [9] or Bisson, Bonnet and Lepelley [3], among
others. In this paper, we only consider the variance2.




(xi − yi)2 ,x∈ Rn and y ∈ Rn (5)
We assume that there exists a link between the target and the weight of player i:w e
impose p1  p2  ...  pn (a more important target implies a more important weight by
hypothesis). The distance between the Shapley-Shubik index and the target is written dSS.
Similarly, the distance between the Banzhaf index and the target is denoted by dB.
Obviously, the distribution of the weights allocated to the players and so the distribution
of power depends on the choice of the power index. In particular, it can be argued that
no power index is ultimately better than another one from a normative point of view, so
there is no speciﬁc reason to privilege one of the index while adopting an inverse problem
perspective. It means that the choice of the power index to determine the distribution of
the weight is of crucial importance. Our main purpose is to examine whether the situations
where the optimal weighted quota games are diﬀerent while using diﬀerent power indices are
frequent. In other words, can we search for the best weighted quota game irrespective of the
choice of power measure when the objective is to equalize inﬂuence with a pre determined
target vector p? As a by product, we will also discover which power index, in average,
minimizes the distance to a target and best performs for the inverse program. More precisely,
we study three points:
2All the results obtained with the variance were also obtained with the other important measure of
distance in the literature, the sum of diﬀerences in absolute value. Since the results were almost the same,
irrespective the choice for a distance, we only present here the results by considering the variance.
5• First, we compute the probability that both power indices give an identical vector of
power for a target chosen randomly from an uniform distribution in the unit simplex
of dimension n.F o rn players, this probability is denoted Pn(B = SS).
• Let GB(p)( r e s p .GSS(p)) be the weighted quota game obtained as a solution of the
inverse problem for a target vector p for the Banzhaf index (resp. the Shapley-Shubik
index). The probability that the inverse problem gives the same institutional solution
is thus denoted by Pn(GB = GSS)f o rn players.
• Thirdly, we compute the probability that the Shapley-Shubik index of power for
GSS(p) implies a minimal distance inferior to the one given by the Banzhaf index
for GB(p) (denoted Pn(B>S S )) and vice-versa (denoted Pn(B<S S )).
Before turning to the general case, we will now study in detail the 3 player game in
order to familiarise the reader with the concepts.
3T h e 3 player case
In this section, we give some analytical results for the particular case of 3 players. We
compute the probability that the minimal distance between the power and the target is the
same with the two power indices, that is the probability P3(B = SS). For this, we have to
determine ﬁrst all the possible vectors of power. Next, we derive P3(GB = GSS)a n dc h e c k
which power index is ”closer” to the target by deriving P3(B>S S )a n dP3(SS > B).
These probabilities are obtained for any quota and any sum of weights. But we can
add some constraints to the inverse program, for example, by ﬁxing the quota to focus on
majority games or by ﬁxing an a priori ¯ w. Some particular cases are studied in the third
subsection.
3.1 The number of possible vectors of power
To our knowledge, there does not exist a general formula to determine all the possible
power vectors for a given n and a given power index. However, for n small, it is possible
to enumerate all the possible cases. The details of the calculus for n =3a r eg i v e ni n
the Appendix and we can summarize these results in table 1. The ﬁrst column gives the
conditions on the weight vector w. Column 2 and 3 indicate the corresponding Banzhaf and
6Shapley-Shubik power vectors. The last column displays one game G for each class, where
the weights and the quota are integers; notice that all the possible games for n =3G1, G2,
G3 and G4 can be described as majority games.
Table 1: The four diﬀerent weighted quota games for n = 3, with examples.
Conditions on w Banzhaf Shapley-Shubik Example
w1 >q β1 =( 1 ,0,0) φ1 =( 1 ,0,0) G1 =( 1 ;2 ,0,0)
w1 + w3 a qa n dw 1 + w2 >q β2 =( 1
2, 1
2,0) φ2 =( 1
2, 1
2,0) G2 =( 1 ;1 ,1,0)
w1 a qa n dw 2 + w3 >q β3 =( 1
3, 1
3, 1
3) φ3 =( 1
3, 1
3, 1
3) G3 =( 3 ;2 ,2,2)
w1 a qa n dw 2 + w3 a qa n dw 1 + w3 >q β4 =( 3
5, 1
5, 1
5) φ4 =( 2
3, 1
6, 1
6) G4 =( 4 ;4 ,2,2)
3.2 A graphic computation of P3(B = SS), P3(GB = GSS) and P3(B>S S )
For the three players case, we can illustrate the inverse problem with simple graphics3.S i n c e
we assume that p1 + p2 + p3 = 1, we can represent all the possible targets in a simplex.
Furthermore, we assume that p1  p2  p3: Thus, the dotted area in Figure 1 represents
all the admissible targets. We assume that any point in this area is equally likely to be an























  0.0833 (6)
If we calculate the distances dB and dSS between a vector of power and a target p,w e
obtain easily:
















6 − p1 for the vector (2/3,1/6,1/6),




2 − p1 − p2 for the vector (1/2,1/2,0),
- dB = dSS =
n
i=1 p2
i +1− 2p1 for the vector (1,0,0).
3A similar graphic interpretation of the power indices has been presented by Jones [6] for the analysis of





























Figure 1: The possible target vectors
We can compare the distances and we obtain that, for the Banzhaf index:
-The vector of power β1 =( 1 ,0,0) and G1 minimize dB if p1 > 5/6.
-The vector of power β2 =( 1 /2,1/2,0) and G2 minimize dB if p2 > 1/3a n dp2 > 5/6−p1.
-The vector of power β3 =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) and G3 minimize dB if p2 < 1/2a n dp2 <
5/6 − p1.
-The vector of power β4 =( 2 /3,1/6,1/6) and G4 minimize dB otherwise, that is if
7/15 <p 1 < 4/5a n dp1 +5 p2 < 23/10.
The diﬀerent zones corresponding to the optimal games are depicted in Figure 2.
The same reasoning for Shapley Shubik enable us to deﬁne the following domains:
-The vector of power φ1 =( 1 ,0,0) and G1 minimize dSS if p1 > 4/5.
-The vector of power φ2 =( 1 /2,1/2,0) and G2 minimize dSS if p2 > 23/50 − p1/5a n d
p2 > 5/6 − p1.
-The vector of power φ3 =( 1 /3,1/3,1/3) and G3 minimize dSS if p2 < 7/15 and
p2 < 5/6 − p1.










































Figure 3: The diﬀerent closest games for the Shapley-Shubik index for n =3
97/15 <p 1 < 4/5a n dp1 +5 p2 < 23/10.
The corresponding zones are depicted in Figure 3. Now, by comparing Figure 2 and 3,
we can immediately identify in Figure 4 the regions where the minimizing distance process
































Thus the probability that the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index give the same







  0.4366 (8)
Similarly, the dotted area D’ in Figure 5 represents the target vectors which lead to















































































3.3 Particular cases: majority weighted games and other constraints
When designing a voting rule, several constraints may complete our model: we may focus
on the majority rule only, or set ¯ w to be an odd integer, for example. We deal here with
the most important voting game in the literature, that is the majority voting game where
q = ¯ w
2 . All the games presented in the table 1 are majority games. However, we show in the
appendix that when ¯ w is odd, only the games G1 and G3 can appear. Hence, the possible
vectors are the same ones with the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices, and trivially,
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Figure 5: Diﬀerent Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf inverse games for n =3
11If ¯ w is even and greater than 4, the four games Gi can appear, thus the results with
the majority game are equivalent to the ones obtain in section 3.2. However, if ¯ w =4w i t h
integer weights, the situation is diﬀerent since the game G3 and its (1/3,1/3,1/3) power
repartition is no longer possible. The detail of the calculus of P3(B = SS) with a graphic
representation are omitted, but with a reasoning similar to the one presented in the previous
subsection, we derive P3(B = SS)= 49
150 ≈ 0.3266.
In conclusion, in this simple three player game, we can see that by slightly changing the
class of voting rules we wish to obtain, the results of the inverse program can be radically
diﬀerent. This drastic changes will also be illustrated in the next section, depending whether
we impose some conditions on the set of possible games.
3.4 Is Shapley-Shubik better than Banzhaf?
In the previous subsection, we have seen that there exists an area D in Figure 4 for which
the minimal distance to a vector of power is diﬀerent and depends on the chosen index of
power. We now determine the area which is such that the Banzhaf index “does better”,
that is minimizes the minimal distance to a vector of power. In other words, for a target
p, we search whether p is closer to a β or a φ vector. We calculate the probability, denoted
P3(B<S S ), that the Banzhaf index gives a minimal distance smaller than the one given
by the Shapley-Shubik index.






















6 − p1.W e o b t a i n p1 < 19/30. In
Figure 4, we can split the dotted area D in two parts: for p1 < 19/3 0 ,t h ec h o i c eo ft h e
Banzhaf index implies a smaller distance than the choice of the Shapley-Shubik index. For
p1 > 19/30, the contrary holds. Therefore, we have



























  0.3133 (11)
12Thus, when the objective is to ﬁnd a distribution of power as close as possible to a pre
established target, the Shapley-Shubik index tends to perform slightly better than the
Banzhaf index. When there is no constraint on the choice of the possible games, this result
will be conﬁrmed for a higher number of players by the following section.
4 The general case, n  3
When the number of players increases, the analytical approach becomes very tedious or
simply impossible when we wish to evaluate the diﬀerent probabilities. For example, there
are at least 14 710 vectors of power with 7 players when we consider the Banzhaf index! A
graphic illustration is no longer possible. Thus, the only solution is to rely upon computer
simulations:
- Firstly, using a computer program presented in a companion paper [2] we enumerate
(and store) the diﬀerent possible vectors of power obtained with the Banzhaf index
and the Shapley-Shubik index. This is done for n =3t on = 8. This method may
not catch all the possible vectors, and we will just get a lower bound on the number
of possible vectors. However, we are quite conﬁdent that we come extremely close to
the exact value.
- Secondly, using this information, we search for the closest games GSS(p)a n dGB(p)
for vectors p drawn from the uniform distribution in the unit simplex Pn (with the
constraint that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ...≥ pn), and then estimate Pn(GB = GSS).
- Thirdly, we estimate the probability that the same Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik vector
of power minimizes the distance with the target, that is we estimate Pn(B = SS).
- Fourthly, we estimate the probability that Shapley-Shubik ”does better” than Banzhaf,
that is Pn(SS < B). This corresponds to the case where the minimal distance to a
Shapley-Shubik vector of power is smaller than the one get with the Banzhaf index.
4.1 The number of vectors of power
The ﬁrst column (q  ¯ w/2) of table 2, present a lower bound for the total number of vectors
of power (for the details of these simulations, see Barth´ el´ emy and Martin [2]). Note that
13these vectors are obtained for all the possible values of the quota q and for all the possible
values of sum of weight ¯ w.
Constraints may be added in order to get the number of vectors of power in more
particular cases. In the two other columns of table 2, the number of vectors of power given
for two relative quotas, the majority game (denoted q =¯ w/2) and the 2/3 majority game(
q =2¯ w/3). In these last cases, it is obvious that the number of vectors of power is less
important4.
Table 3 gives the number of vectors of power in the case where there is no dummy player
(a dummy player is a player without power). In fact, we may impose, while minimizing the
distance to a vector of power, that each player has at least a positive power, which means
that we should exclude some power vectors and some games as possible outputs.
4.2 Computation of Pn(GB = GSS) for n ≥ 3
The ﬁrst column of table 4 displays the probabilities Pn(GB = GSS)f o rn =3 ,4,5,6. The
ﬁgures in this table tell us whether the choice of a power index has an impact on the choice
of the weighted game that better ﬁts to a pre established target. The answer is clear:
the probability that the optimal weighted quota games are the same declines steadily as n
increases. The choice of a ”best voting mechanism” cannot be done irrespective of the power
index that we choose. Notice that we have computed Pn(GB = GSS)w i t hn or e s t r i c t i o n
of the game, allowing in particular for games with dummy players and any value for the
quota. By focussing on majority games only (Column 2, Table 4), the higher values that we
observe neither prevent us from a steady decline for Pn(GB = GSS)a sn increases. Quite
surprisingly, the ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows that considering games without dummy
players tends to slightly increase the probability of agreement when all quota games are
possible.
4Notice that when q is ﬁxed, we have always obtained an equal number of vectors of power for the two
indices. The diﬀerence in the number of vectors for the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index is due
to the fact that the same vectors can be obtained for diﬀerent ﬁxed values of q and ¯ w.
14All q q =¯ w/2 q =2¯ w/3
n Banzhaf Shapley Banzhaf Shapley Banzhaf Shapley
Shubik Shubik Shubik
3 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 12 11 9 9 9 9
5 57 53 27 27 27 27
6 555 536 138 138 133 133
7 14 710 14 178 1 663 1 663 1 440 1 440
8 63 583 63 583 44 934 44 934
Table 2: An estimation of the number of vectors of power for the Banzhaf and Shapley-
Shubik indices of power.
All q q =¯ w/2 q =2¯ w/3
n Banzhaf Shapley Banzhaf Shapley Banzhaf Shapley
Shubik Shubik Shubik
3 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 8 7 5 5 5 5
5 45 42 18 18 18 18
6 498 483 111 111 106 106
7 14 155 13 642 1 509 1 509 1 298 1 298
Table 3: An estimation of the number of vectors of power with no dummy player for the
Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices of power.
Table 4: Pn(GB = GSS) for n =3 ,4,5,6,7.
n all q q =¯ w/2 q =2¯ w/3 q =3¯ w/4
3 89.92 89.92 89.92 89.92
4 65.68 86.23 62.68 59.87
5 44.52 73.98 39.92 21.27
6 34.60 62.63 30.82 06.93
7 45.08 14.69 04.46
154.3 Probability of equal minimal distance for Banzhaf and Shapley Shu-
bik indices without or with constraints
T og e tt h er e s u l td i s p l a y e do nt a b l e s4a n d5 ,w eh a v eg e n e r a t e dt h ed i ﬀerent vectors of
power for the Banzhaf and Shapley Shubik power indices for a given number of players
(n =3 ,...,8). Hence, for a given target vector p = {p1,...,p n},t h eoptimal vector of
power can be found, optimal in the sense that it minimizes a the distance between the index
of power and the target vector (see the previous section, for the case where n = 3). Let’s
denote, dB∗
(p)a n ddSS∗
(p) the minimal distances in the two studied cases for a target
vector p.
Generating P target vectors by simulation5, we can also evaluate the proportion of cases
where dB∗
(p)=dSS∗
(p). Table 6 presents the estimated probabilities for the three diﬀerent
values of q studied in the previous section. For the case where q>¯ w/2, 0.4396 is an
estimation of the theoretical value 0.4366 calculated in the previous section.6 As one may
have guessed, the probability of having the same optimal repartition of the power among
the players with two diﬀerent indices quickly crashes for all the cases (diﬀerent relative
quotas, presence or absence of dummy players, see table 7).
5In order to avoid noise due to sampling variations, the same P target vectors have been used for all the
cases. The same seed has been used to generate uniform (pseudo) random numbers for all the simulation.
P is set to 10 000 for the estimations.
6The 99% conﬁdent interval [0.4238;0.4494] contains the true probability Prob(B = SS)w h i c hi se q u a l
to 0.4366.
164.4 Is Shapley-Shubik better than Banzhaf?
The previous subsection focused on the probability of having the same vector of power for
Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik when minimizing the distance between the indices of power
and a target. This result may be extended and we may estimate:
- the probability that the minimal distance obtained with the Banzhaf index is less than




- the probability that the minimal distance obtained with the Banzhaf index is greater
than the one obtained with the Shapley-Shubik index; the estimation is the proportion
of cases where dB∗
(p) >d SS∗
(p).
These two estimated probabilities as well as the probability of equality between those
two indices are presented in tables 8 (with dummies) and 9 (without dummies) for the
case where q>¯ w/2 with all the vectors of power. The numbers in bold correspond to
the probabilities presented in the table 6. The slight ”advantage” of the Shapley-Shubik
compared to the Banzhaf that we observed for n = 3 still prevails and seems to increase
when we impose a positive power for all the players.
The fact that the possible Shapley-Shubik vectors perform better when we wish to come
as close as possible to a pre established target is still observed with majority games (see
tables 10 and 11 but disappears for the 2/3 and 3/4 quotas (tables 12, 13, 14, 15).
17Table 5: Pn(GB = GSS) for games without dummy player.
n all q q =¯ w/2 q =2¯ w/3 q =3¯ w/4
3 91.50 91.50 91.50 91.50
4 70.15 95.47 70.06 65.78
5 48.94 75.13 44.15 27.61
6 35.46 62.46 25.79 07.05
7 42.17 10.48 03.38
Table 6: Probability of having the same minimal distance for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik
indices of power.
n all q q =¯ w/2 q =2¯ w/3 q =3¯ w/4
3 43.96 43.96 43.96 43.96
4 32.09 61.95 25.41 12.67
5 08.74 27.51 18.27 03.21
6 02.18 13.60 06.59 01.51
7 05.95 02.01 00.65
Table 7: Probability of having the same minimal distance for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik
indices of power without dummy player.
n all q q =¯ w/2 q =2¯ w/3 q =3¯ w/4
3 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
4 29.83 74.02 18.97 02.24
5 05.14 09.84 10.94 00.06
6 01.68 05.02 00.00 00.61
7 02.16 00.00 00.03
18Table 8: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, all q
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 24.75 43.96 31.29
4 32.33 32.09 35.58
5 42.07 08.74 49.19
6 46.36 02.18 51.46
19Table 9: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, all q, without dummy player
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 43.44 16.38 40.18
4 30.59 29.83 39.58
5 41.89 05.14 52.97
6 44.77 01.68 53.55
Table 10: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, q =¯ w/2.
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 24.75 43.96 31.29
4 19.87 61.95 18.18
5 29.97 27.51 42.52
6 34.89 13.60 51.51
7 38.13 05.95 55.92
Table 11: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, q =¯ w/2, without dummy player.
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 43.44 16.38 40.18
4 17.31 74.02 08.67
5 35.51 09.84 54.65
6 35.56 05.02 59.42
7 38.24 02.16 59.60
20Table 12: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, q =2¯ w/3.
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 24.75 43.96 31.29
4 41.29 25.41 33.30
5 50.99 18.27 30.74
6 61.58 06.59 31.83
7 69.12 02.01 28.87
Table 13: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, q =2¯ w/3, without dummy player.
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 43.44 16.38 40.18
4 45.06 18.97 35.97
5 55.10 10.94 33.96
6 66.99 00.00 33.01
7 70.94 00.00 29.06
Table 14: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, q =3¯ w/4.
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 24.75 43.96 31.29
4 46.79 12.67 40.54
5 60.66 03.21 36.13
6 68.77 01.51 29.72
7 74.98 00.65 24.37
21Table 15: Probability of having a Banzhaf minimal distance under, equal or over the Shapley-
Shubik’s one, q =3¯ w/4, without dummy player.
n Pn(B<S S ) Pn(B = SS) Pn(B>S S )
3 43.44 16.38 40.18
4 52.65 02.24 45.11
5 62.11 00.06 37.83
6 69.48 00.61 29.91
7 75.71 00.03 24.26
224.5 Graphical representations
The two minimal distances relative to the two indices of power can be represented in a two
dimension space: the Shapley-Shubik minimal distance as a function of the Banzhaf min-
imal distance. To each target vector p corresponds a point (dB∗
(p),d SS∗
(p))in this space.
Then, as we have generated P = 1 000 000 target vectors, we may have a scatter plot of a
1 000 000 points. In the case of perfect adequation between these two minimal distances,
the scatter plots would be linear (it would be the ﬁrst bisecting line of the two dimensional
space). In such a graph, hundred percents of the generated population vectors would lead
to the same minimal distance for the two indices of power. Then, the ﬁrst bisecting line
will be the reference.
The percentage of points plotted on the ﬁrst bisecting line corresponds to the estimated
probability of having the same minimal distance for the indices of power, this estimated
probability being listed in tables 6 and 8. The estimated probability that the minimal
distance obtained with the Banzhaf index is less than the one obtained with the Shapley-
Shubik index is graphically the percentage of points plotted over the bisecting line (with
Shapley-Shubik represented on the y axes). In the same way, the percentage of points plot-
ted below the ﬁrst bisecting line corresponds to the estimated probability that the minimal
distance obtained with the Banzhaf index is higher than the one obtained with the Shapley-
Shubik index.
For instance, for the majority game, the following results appear from the graphical repre-
sentations (ﬁgures 6 and 7):
- the relative weight of the bisecting line is decreasing as n increases.
- the distribution of points above and over this line is not symmetric.
- the higher values of distance are computed with the Banzhaf index.
Moreover, the minimal distance cumulative distributions for a given number of player
can be estimated (using the P simulations). Figure 8 illustrates in the case of 3 players,
the fact that Banzhaf minimal distances may be higher than the Shapley-Shubik’s (this is
linked to the asymmetry around the bisecting line shown in the scatter plots).
23Figure 6: Scatter plots with n =3
24Figure 7: Scatter plots with n =6
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper was partly designed as an application of the method proposed by Barth´ el´ emy and
Martin [2] for the enumeration of all the possible weighted quota games. When designing a
voting rule, we may wish the voters not to have the same inﬂuence in the decision process.
By choosing adequately the weights and the quota in a weighted quota game, we may try
to come as close as possible to the desired repartition of inﬂuence among the players. To
realize this objective, we eﬀectively need to know what are all the possible weighted quota
games at our disposal. Thus, the main objective of this paper was to prove that this exercise
could not be done irrespectively of the choice of the power index. For 6 players, the Shapley
Shubik index and the Banzhaf index already disagree on the optimal game to choose for
about two third of the cases. Unfortunately, the large number of possible games for small
values of n (at least 14710 for n = 7) did not allow us to estimate the probability for a
larger number of players, and it may be diﬃcult to obtain results for signiﬁcatively higher
values, even if we restrict ourselves to majority games with no dummy players (see Table
25Figure 8: Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik minimal distances repartition function in the 3
player case
267).
We have also observed that the Shapley-Shubik index seems to performs slightly better
than the Banzhaf index when the objective is to minimize the distance to a target. However,
the results we have for n =3t on = 6 depend on the fact that all the possible weighted
quota games are available at the same time. They cannot be extrapolated for ﬁxed relative
quotas. On this ground, we can compare our results to the ones obtained by Chang, Chua
and Machover [4] which tested the Penrose’s law for high values of n. Penrose’s law asserts
that, under certain conditions, the ration between the Banzhaf power of any two voters
converges to the ratio between their weights as n increases. Using the sum of diﬀerences
in absolute values, Chang, Chua and Machover proved that the conjecture is true for the
Banzhaf index, going from n =1 5t on = 55, and q close to ¯ w/2. They also performed
the same exercise for the Shapley-Shubik index, showing that then Penrose’s conjecture is
true for almost all the values of q. From their tables, we can also derive that, on average,
the proportionality seems to be slightly better for the Banzhaf index than for the Shapley
Shubik index. This is in fact corroborated by the results we obtained when we set the
r e l a t i v eq u o t at ob eﬁxed at the level 2/3 or 3/4 for n =3t on =7 .
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286A p p e n d i x
Let {q,w1,w 2,w 3} be a voting game. Firstly, we determine all the diﬀerent vectors of power
with the two power indices. Let us begin with the Banzhaf index. All the coalitions are
{1,2,3}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3}, {1}, {2} and {3}.S i n c ew1  w2  w3 and the voting game
is proper, v({2})=0a n dv({3})=0 . A s s u m ev({1}) = 1. It means that the player 1
belongs to all the winning coalitions, it has all the power (it is always a decisive player)
and the vector of power is (1,0,0). Assume now that v({1})=0a n dv({2,3})=1 .T h u s
we have v({1,2,3})=1 ,v({1,3})=1a n dv({1,2})=1 . I n{1,2,3}, there is no decisive
player while in {1,2}, {1,3} and {2,3}, every player is decisive. Therefore the vector of
power is (1/3,1/3,1/3). Assume now that v({2,3})=0a n dv({1,3}) = 1. Thus we have
v({1,2,3})=1a n dv({1,2})=1 .I n{1,2,3}, only the player 1 is decisive while in {1,2},
and {1,3} every player is decisive. Therefore the vector of power is (3/5,1/5,1/5). Assume
now that v({1,3})=0a n dv({1,2}) = 1. Thus we have v({1,2,3})=1 .I n{1,2,3},o n l y
the player 3 is not decisive while in {1,2} every player is decisive. Therefore the vector of
power is (1/2,1/2,0). Assume now that v({1,2})=0 ,w eh a v ev({1,2,3})=1 .I n{1,2,3},
every player is decisive and the vector of power is (1/3,1/3,1/3). Finally, there are 4 vectors
of power, (1/3,1/3,1/3), (3/5,1/5,1/5), (1/2,1/2,0) and (1,0,0).
For the Shapley-Shubik index with 3 players, there are 6 possible orders. If v({1})=1 ,
then the player 1 is the only pivotal, even if it arrives last in the coalition, thus the vector
of power is (1,0,0). Assume now that v({1})=0a n dv({2,3}) = 1. Thus we have
v({1,2,3})=1 ,v({1,3})=1a n dv({1,2}) = 1. For each order, the player which is in
second position is pivotal, therefore the vector of power is (1/3,1/3,1/3). Assume now that
v({2,3})=0a n dv({1,3}) = 1. Thus we have v({1,2,3})=1a n dv({1,2}) = 1. When the
player 1 is not ﬁrst in the order, it is always pivotal and when the player 1 is ﬁrst in the
orders, the pivotal is the player which arrives second in the order. Therefore the vector of
power is (2/3,1/6,1/6). Assume now that v({1,3})=0a n dv({1,2}) = 1. Thus we have
v({1,2,3})=1 . W h e nt h ep l a y e r1i sﬁrst in the order, the player 2 is pivotal and when
the player 2 is ﬁrst in the order, the player 1 is pivotal. In the orders 312 and 321, the
player which arrives last is pivotal. Therefore the vector of power is (1/2,1/2,0). Assume
now that v({1,2})=0 ,w eh a v ev({1,2,3}) = 1. Thus it is always the player who arrives
last in the orders the pivotal and the vector of power is (1/3,1/3,1/3). Finally, there are 4
vectors of power, (1/3,1/3,1/3), (2/3,1/6,1/6), (1/2,1/2,0) and (1,0,0).
29In the reasoning above, the quota is not ﬁxed since our purpose is to determine all the
possible vectors of power. We show now that the result can be diﬀerent if we consider the
majority games. The result is diﬀerent in function of the parity of ¯ w.
* ¯ w is odd. It means that v(S)=0 ⇐⇒ v(N\S)=1 . A s s u m et h a tv(1) = 1, the
vector of power is thus (1,0,0), with the two power indices. Actually, the player 1 is the
only player who is decisive since v(2,3) = 0. Assume now that v(1) = 0, thus v(2,3) = 1,
and v(1,3) = v(1,2) = 1. All the players are decisive the same number of times with the
two power indices : the vector of power is (1/3,1/3,1/3). Therefore we have two possible
solutions and these are the same for the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index.
∗¯ w is even. We show that, for any ¯ w>4, the four vectors of power are possible. In
this case, the probability is the same as above since the conditions are not modiﬁed.
For (1,0,0), it is obvious if we suppose that w1 =¯ w.
For (1/2,1/2,0), we must have w1+w2 >q , w1+w3 a q and w1 a q.L e tw1 = w2 = ¯ w
2,
this implies w3 = 0, the conditions are veriﬁed.
For (3/5,1/5,1/5) for Banzhaf and (2/3,1/6,1/6) for Shapley-Shubik, we must have
w1+w3 >q , w2+w3 a q and w1 a q.A s s u m et h a tw1 < ¯ w
2.T h i si m p l i e st h a tw2+w3 > ¯ w
2
or w2 + w3 >qwhich is not possible. Thus w1 = ¯ w
2 and w2 + w3 = q.A s s u m ew3 =1a n d
w2 =¯ w − w1 − w3 and the conditions are trivially veriﬁed.
For (1/3,1/3,1/3), we must have w1 a q and w2 + w3 >qor w1 + w2 a q.L e t
w1 = w2 = q − 1a n dw3 = 2, which is possible since ¯ w is even and the conditions w1 a q
and w2+w3 >qare veriﬁed. Notice that if ¯ w = 4, all the vectors of power are not possible.
In this case, w1 is necessary equal to 2, the condition w2 + w3 >qor w1 + w2 a q are not
possible.
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